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Abstract
Why do firms and banks hold foreign currency  learn the true type of the monetary  authority. The model
denominated liabilities?  Cowan and Do argue that  has clear-cut  policy  implications  regarding the taxation
foreign currency  debt, by altering the effect of a  of foreign  currency liabilities as a way to encourage
devaluation on output, has a disciplining  effect when the  perfect information  and avoid dollarization traps.
Central Bank's objectives differ from the social optimum.  Moreover,  it reinforces the existing argument for Central
However,  under imperfect  information,  bad priors about  Bank independence.  Finally, the authors believe this
the Central Bank induce excess dollarization  of liabilities,  model to be consistent with  a growing empirical
which in turn limits the ability of the Central Bank to  literature  on the determinants of foreign currency
conduct an optimal monetary policy.  In addition the  liabilities and their relationships to Central Bank
economy  may become  stuck in a "dollarization  trap" in  credibility.
which dollarized liabilities limit the ability of agents to
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Much  has been  written recently  on the impact  of foreign  currency  denominated  debt  in emerging
market  economies.  A series  of papers  have argued that liability dollarization  played  an important
role  in recent  "crisis"  episodes  in East  Asia  (and  more recently  in Argentina)  and  as  such  is  an
important  source  of  financial  fragility.  Another  line  of research  has discussed  how  governments
should respond to dollar-debt,  in particular  how dollar-debt  alters the trade-offs  between fixed and
flexible exchange rates.  The debate on dollar-debt has been particularly vigorous in Latin America,
where a substantial fraction of total debt is denominated  in dollars in many countries  as described
in figure  (1).
In this paper  we argue  that, by altering  the effect  of a devaluation  on output,  dollar-debt  can
play a role in disciplining  an overly  expansive monetary  authority.  This restraint  does  not come
for  free.  In the short run  dollar  debt  increases  the likelihood  of financial  distress  and limits  the
capacity of the Central Bank to conduct stabilizing monetary  policy.  In the long run, the presence
of dollar-debt  may limit the  ability of the monetary  authority to  gain credibility,  as it  is difficult
for agents to determine how the Central  Bank would behave in the absence of dollarized liabilities.
In our model, when information is complete,  interest rates adjust to incorporate  the disciplining
effects  of dollar-debt, leading to an optimal currency composition choice by firms.  When the Central
Bank exhibits a devaluation bias, lenders are willing to make dollar loans cheaper.  Agents then take
on  larger  amounts  of dollar-debt  making  a devaluation  more  costly,  thus  mitigating such  a bias.
In this framework,  portfolio  compositions  optimally trade-off  the cost  of an excessive  devaluation
with the likelihood  of such an event.
The level  of dollar-debt  may no  longer be optimal  when  agents  are uncertain  about  the  true
parameters of the economy.  If the  Central  Bank lacks credibility,  then dollarization may exceed its
full-information  level.  The immediate effect  of this lack of credibility is that agents tie the hands of
the Central Bank excessively,  restricting its ability to conduct  monetary policy.  In the long-run, the
effects  of imperfect information  can be exacerbated,  as excess dollarization  has additional dynamic
effects.  By taking on dollar-debt,  agents  also limit the Bank's capacity to reveal its type.  By doing
so,  the  economy  can be stuck  in an a long run  equilibrium  with  suboptimal  (too  high)  levels  of
dollar-debt  and  imperfect learning.  A useful  analogy  to the dynamic  problem  is  that of a  parole
board deciding whether  to release  a convict.  Leaving  the convict  in prison will make it extremely
costly for the good prisoner  to differentiate  himself from the evil bastard.  Priors about the convict
will remain unchanged,  as any good behavior  in prison is attributed  to the restrictions  placed on
the convict's  freedom.  Similarly,  a seemingly  responsible  monetary policy  can  be interpreted  as
the outcome of large amounts of dollar-debt rather  than an absence  of a devaluation  bias, making
dollarization  a persistent phenomenon.
The key  result  of this paper  is  that  giving agents  the option to  mute the Central  Bank  has
perverse effects when the latter lacks credibility.  We then raise the question of dollar-debt taxation
and capital  account  liberalization.  In particular,  we argue that,  by temporarily restricting  agents'
ability to take on dollar-debt,  governments  can give  the  opportunity  to the Central  Bank  to gain
credibility  at  a lower cost.
We believe this model  to be consistent  with stylized facts surrounding  dollarization of liabilities
in  emerging  economies.  The  first  of these  is  the overall  lack  of  success  of  empirical  papers  in
determining causes of dollarization,  or the  "mystery of original sin" as it is referred to by Hausmann
2and Panizza  (2002).  If the optimal currency  composition  of debt  is (at least  in part)  determined
by agents priors  regarding the monetary  authority, it is not surprising that current macroeconomic
variables  fail to capture much  of the cross-country  variation  in liability dollarization.  The second
fact is the positive  and significant  correlation  between  inflationary history,  financial  development
and dollarization:  dollarization  seems  to be high in  economies  in which monetary  authorities  lack
credibility.  To illustrate this correlation,  Figure (2)  plots the measure of "original sin"  of Hausmann
and Panizza against  average  inflation in the previous two decades.
Our model combines  two strands  of the dollar-liability  literature:  (i)  that which  explores  the
effects  of exchange  rate policy  on the  optimal  choice  of debt  composition  by  private agents  and
(ii)  that which explores  the effects of dollarized  debt  on the response of an economy to  aggregate
shocks and therefore on exchange rate policy.  In particular we assume that debt composition affects
the optimal exchange rate policy  and that simultaneously expectations about exchange  rate policy
have a bearing on the optimal currency composition of debt by agents.  This paper is also related to
the literature on optimal monetary  policy and the  debate on fixed versus floating exchange rates1.
The contribution  of this paper to the dollar-debt literature is two-fold.  On the one hand we discuss
the role of dollar-debt  issued by private agents  as a disciplining  device  for the monetary authority.
On  the other hand,  we discuss  the implications  of dollar-debt  on Central  Bank  credibility  in an
imperfect information  setting.
The paper proceeds as follows.  In section 2 we provide  a brief overview of existing empirical  and
theoretical literature  on liability  dollarization and by doing  so, motivate some of the assumptions
made elsewhere in the paper.  Section 3 sets up our basic model and solves it under full information.
The following section, section  4, introduces signalling  issues and makes the main point of the paper:
agents can be stuck in persistent states where they have imperfect knowledge about the parameters
of the economy.  Section 5 discusses possible policy implications, while  section 6 concludes.
2  Causes  and Effects of Dollar-Debt...  WVhat  Do We Know?
At center  stage in the discussion of dollar-debt is the mismatch that foreign currency debt generates
between the currency denomination of assets and liabilities.  Following a devaluation,  an agent with
a currency  mismatch  will  see the  "peso"  value of his debt expand  by more than that of his assets
or income.  The key  assumption  in this literature,  is that the resulting drop in the net worth has
real  costs:  a balance-sheet  effect.  Consequently,  the expansionary  effect  which a depreciation  is
typically  assumed to have,  may be attenuated  or  even reversed  by the effects  of a devaluation  on
firms that are highly leveraged  in dollar-debt.
A first strand of the literature has developed  models to explore the macroeconomic  implications
of  currency  mismatches.  In  the  work  of both  Krugman  (1999a,  1999b)  and  Aghion,  Bachetta,
and Banerjee  (2001),  the balance-sheet  effect  is assumed  to be  large enough to dominate  the ex-
pansionary  Mundell-Fleming  effects.  This strongly  negative relationship  between  investment  and
depreciation  can give rise to multiple equilibria,  and hence the potential for an expectation-driven
exchange  rate crisis.  The potentially destabilizing  effects of a devaluation in the presence of dollar-
debt are also  discussed in Cespedes,  Chang  and Velasco  (2001)  - although  the authors emphasize
that dollar-debt  does not necessarily  lead to  "macroeconomic  damnation".
'See Rogoff  (1995)  for an overview of the literature.
3Although it is clear that many economies  in East Asia had substantial levels of dollar-debt both
in  the banking  sector  and on firms'  balance  sheets,  empirical  evidence on  how large the resulting
balance-sheet  effects  may  have  been  is  far  from  conclusive2. On the  one  hand,  Claessens  and
Djankov  (2000)  argue that inflated domestic debt and interest payments may have led to wide scale
insolvency  and  liquidity  problems  in  East Asian firms.  On the other hand,  Bleakley  and  Cowan
(2002)  provide evidence  that the balance-sheet  effect,  although present  in firms  in Latin America,
is dominated  by the competitiveness  gains  from a devaluation.
Independently  from where the empirical and theoretical  debate on the effects of dollar-debt may
stand, there  is evidence that monetary  authorities  do factor  debt  composition  variables  into their
exchange rate policies.  Although  they do not  test it empirically,  Calvo  and Reinhart  (2002)  argue
that pervasive liability  dollarization may be one cause of the  "fear of floating".  Panizza,  Hausmann
and Stein  (2001)  investigate this proposition,  and find a relationship  between  a country's exchange
rate policy and  its ability to  borrow internationally  in its own currency  - which they argue  is an
indicator  of a  country's  ability  to  avoid currency  mismatches.  More  specifically,  they  find  that
countries  that can  borrow  abroad in  their own  currencies  hold  lower  levels of  reserves  and  allow
larger  fluctuations  in the  exchange rate  relative  to  reserves  and interest  rates.  Along these  same
lines,  Levy-Yeyati,  Sturzenegger  and  Reggio  (2003),  using a de facto and  de jure exchange regime
classification,  find that foreign currency-denominated  liabilities (measured relative to money stocks)
are positively correlated with the probability of pegging the exchange rate against a major currency.
A second strand of the literature on dollar-debt  looks at firm and country level  determinants of
dollar  liabilities.  The key question here being, if dollar-debt  exposes firms to substantial  exchange
rate  risk,  why  do  they  take it  on  in  the first  place?  Most  of the explanations  that have  been
put  forward  in  the  literature  rely  a  failure  in  uncovered  interest  rate  parity,  which  leads  to  a
lower  ex  ante dollar  rate.  One  set  of models  argues  that  dollarized  debt  entitles  the creditor
to larger  payments  in  those  states  of  the world  in  which  default  is  likely,  lowering  the required
interest  payments  on dollar-debt3 . Another set of models  emphasizes  how interest rates adjust to
incorporate  disciplining  effects of dollar-debt  on  firm behavior.  In Jeanne  (2000a and  2000b),  for
example,  dollar-debt  reduces information  asymmetry and moral hazard.  Lenders  then incorporate
these effects into the rates they charge  on peso  and dollar  debt loans.  Finally, in Calvo  (1999)  and
(2001)  the failure  of uncovered interest  parity  can  be attributed to the interaction  of information
asymmetries,  regulatory restrictions  in the banking sector and to the costs of forming devaluation
expectations 4.
The extent to which  agents  take advantage of the cheaper foreign-currency  credit is then deter-
mined by impact of a currency  mismatch  on the volatility of their net-worth  and the costs of this
increased volatility5.  In  this coiatext  a pegged  exchange rate regime is  a form of insurance  against
exchange rate fluctuations.  In the words of Mishkin (1996):  "daily fluctuations in the exchange rate
in the flexible regime have the advantage of making clear.. that there is a substantial  risk involved in
2See Eichengreen  and  Hausmann  ':1999), World  Bank  (2001)  for  data on dollarization  in East  Asia
3For Schneider  and Tornell  (2001)  these transfers  takes  place within  the banking  sector,  where  bailouts to dollar
indebted  banks acompany  devaluations.  Chamon  (2001), on the other hand, argues that defaults  are often correlated
with  depreciations,  so that holders  of dollar debt  recieve  a larger  share of the  liquidated  assets.
4Regulatory  constraints  on currency  mismatch encourage  foreign  banks to lend in the their own  currency so that
they  charge a premium  on peso rates.  Similar regulatory  constraints  force  domestic  banks to match  dollar deposits
with  dollar  loans.  Because  of information  advantages,  these banks  have  incentives  to place  this debt  domestically
leading to a lower equilibrium  rate  on dollar  loans.
5That  risk  averse  firms  choose  debt  composition  to hedge  exchange  rate  shocks  (i.e.  to  "match")  is  discussed
for the banking sector  by Ize and Levy-Yeyati  (1998)  and  Arteta (2002),  and for firms by Conesa-Labastida  (1997),
Calvo (2001),  Martinez and  Werner  (2001)  and Cowan  (2002).
4issuing liabilities denominated in foreign currencies". Along these lines, an additional reason, often
cited for dollarized  debt, is the lack of an adequate long-term  domestic currency  debt market  - the
original sin view  of Eichengreen  and  Hausmann  (1999).  According  to this view,  firms  are willing
to take on exchange  rate risk to avoid  the interest  rate risk  inherent in short-term  peso liabilities.
Empirically there is no evidence on the alleged failures of uncovered interest rate parity and some
evidence that higher  exchange rate volatility reduces currency  mismatch.  Using cross-country data
for the banking sector,  Arteta (2002)  finds evidence that more volatile exchange rate regimes reduce
the share  of foreign currency  denominated  loans  and deposits.  Additional  evidence is provided by
Martinez and Werner (2001) using a sample of Mexican firms.  They find that matching is higher and
average  dollarization lower after the "tequila"  crisis,  a period of flexible exchange rates6. Probably
because of lack of data, there is scarce empirical work on other possible cross-country  determinants
of dollar-debt.  One exception  to this is  the recent  work  by  Eichengreen,  Hausmann  and  Panizza
(2002).  The title of their paper  ("The  Mystery of Original  Sin:  The Case of the Missing  Apple"  )
sums up their main conclusion,  namely countries with very similar macroeconomic  situations have
vastly different levels of dollarization.  Amongst  the few variables that are positively correlated with
"domestic original sin"  (foreign  currency debt  in total domestic  borrowing)  are the  level, variance
and maximum  past value  of inflation,  and financial  development  - all proxies for monetary  policy
credibility.
3  A Static Complete  Information Framework
Consider an economy with a continuum of identical agents and one  good used for both production
and consumption.  Agents invest one  unit in a project  with stochastic  returns.  As entrepreneurs
have  no  resources,  they  borrow from  lenders.  We  assume  that  supply  of such  goods  is  infinite.
The country is  endowed with  a Central Bank,  which controls  exchange  rates.  We denote  by s the
change in the  exchange rate  e (the price  of dollars in terms  of pesos) between  T =  0 and T =  1.
The timing of the economy is as follows:
*  at time  T =  0,  contracts  are signed  between  lenders  and  entrepreneurs.  The space  of  con-
tracts is  restricted to the set of debt  contracts  linear in s.  Such  financial contract  can thus
be considered  as  linear  combinations  of peso-debt  contracts  and dollar-debt  contracts.  We
normalize the exchange  rate so that e =  1 at T =  0.
*  at time T =  1, a demand  shock i  is realized,  the Central Bank observes  the contracts  signed
at time T  =  0  and sets its exchange  rate policy  s.  z  is  assumed to be distributed  over R+
with distribution function  F  (.)  with mean m.  For technical  reasons, we assume  that F  (.)  is
integrable.
*  at time T =  2, output Y is realized.  Payments  are made to lenders, consumption  takes  place
and agents  die.
6Cowan  (2002)  obtains  similar  results  in a sample  of five  countries  from  Latin  America  and  the  Carribean.  In
addition, the correlations obtained by Hausmann,  Panizza and Stein (2001)  and Levy-Yeyati,  Sturzenegger  and Reggio
(2003)  also suggest  that dollarization  is higher  in pegged exchange regimes.
53.1  Technology  and Preferences
Characterizing the output function Y is crucial to our paper.  We take the view that exchange rates
have real  effects  on output.  On  the one  hand,  by raising  the exchange  rate,  the  Central  Bank is
able to have a positive effect  on aggregate  demand - a Mundell-Fleming  effect.  On the other hand,
following Lahiri  and Vegh (2001)  and Jeanne  (2002),  we assume that changes  in the exchange rate
also have  adverse  effects  on  DUtpUt  - a distortionary  effect.  Thus,  the  exchange rate has  a non-
monotonic impact  on output, depending on which of the Mundell-Fleming  or distortionary  effects
dominates.
An additional  feature of  V is specific  to our model.  Following  Jeanne  (2003)  we  assume that
there is  a  level  of  dollar-debt  Dm  >  0 that  minimizes  the  effects  of exchange  rate  fluctuations
on firm balance sheets.  The gap  between the level of dollar  debt held by entrepreneurs  and this
"matching"  level ID - Dml  increases the cost  of a devaluation.
In order to account  for the effects  previously  described,  we  will specify  the output function as
follows:
Y (xIS,  D) = x + Os-L (S,  ID-DmI)X  . (1)
where x + Os is aggregate demand,  and the Os term captures  the Mundell-Fleming  effect.  The func-
tion s -* L (s, D) satisfies the Inada conditions.  Furthermore,  for any s, D > 0, L (.) is continuously
differentiable  with respect  to  (s, D) and
LSD ()  > 0.  (2)
Hence, the loss function L (.) incorporates  the distortionary  effect  of exchange rate changes  at each
level of dollarization D, as well as the balance-sheet  effect through condition  (2)7.  For simplicity in
the rest  of the discussion  we assume that Dm = 0,  in the understanding  that it is really deviations
from an optimal  level  of dollarization that have  costly  real  effects on  output.  Finally,  we assume
that the cost related to the balance-sheet  effect is convex,  so that for any s, D > 0,
LDD (.)  > 0.  (3)
Agents are risk-neutral, maximizing time T = 2 expected output, as they do not consume at date
T = 0,  nor do they have access to any savings instrument.  Lenders are risk-neutral  and value T = 0
and T = 2 consumption equally.  Furthermore,  in this economy, the Central Bank sets exchange rate
policy in order to maximize  an exogenous objective  function.  The crucial assumption  is that there
is a mismatch between the  Central Bank's objective function  and the welfare  of the representative
entrepreneur.  Indeed, we assume that the Central Bank values inflation more than what is socially
optimal,  so that the Central  Bank  gross utility function  (i.e.  before debt  repayments)  is given  for
any x E R by
WCB (x, s, D) = Y (xls, D) + k (s)
where  the  term  X (s)  captures  additional  Central  Bank  utility  gain  from  inflation.  We  assume
that  p  (.) is increasing  and concave and  q (0)  = 0.  Although  the text refers  to the term 0(s)  as
seniorage,  it could  equally  Wfl  be  a result  of Central  Bank  time  inconsistency.  The mismatch is
captured  by the fact that entrepreneurs  gross welfare  is given  by
W (s, D) = ExY  (xZs, D)
7A costly-verification  model  augmented with  a Mundell-Flemming  effect  would generate  such a loss function  (see
Chamon  2002,  or Jeanne  2003).
63.2  Optimal  Portfolio Choice
Assuming that a central planner decides dollarization and devaluation  levels, the choice of peso-debt
d, dollar-debt  D and devaluation  level s is given by:
maxE,Y (xIs, D)
a,d,D
subject to lenders' break-even  condition:
E. {min [d + (1 + s) D; Y (xls, D)]} =  1,
which can also  be written, after  an integration  by parts,
d+(l+s)D
d+(1+s)D=l+  j  F(Yls,D)dY,
where  F (.js, D) is  the cumulative  distribution of output  Y,  contingent  on the vector  (s, D), and
the feasibility  condition:
D > 0.
The  first-order  conditions  then imply that  the optimal  level  of dollar-debt  is  DFB =  0 and  the
optimal exchange rate policy  sFB satisfies the first-order conditions,  i.e.
- = L. (FB,  0).  (4)
Regularity conditions imply that sFB is well-defined.  The social planner sets exchange rate policy in
order to optimally tradeoff the Mundell-Flernming  and distortionary effects.  Note that, by adopting
a linear  demand  function,  we  voluntarily  ignored the countercyclical  characteristics  of monetary
policy,  making the choice  of sFB independent  of the realization  of i.  Finally,  under the regularity
assumptions,  the lenders'  break-even  condition  determines the first-best  level of peso-debt
dFB
dFB  1+  F  (yIsFB, 0) dY.
3.3  Equilibrium Analysis
We first consider  the unconstrained  exchange  rate policy  and portfolio decisions.  The equilibrium
outcome is  determined  by lenders'  interest rate choices  for  peso and dollar  debt,  agents'  portfolio
decisions  and market-clearing  conditions.  In order  our initial intuition  to hold,  it  is critical  that
there is some coordination among lenders.  Thus we assume:
Assumption  AO:  There is perfect coordination  among lenders.
Although assumption  AO  seems  strong, partial coordination  is enough  for our results  to hold.
When taken together with perfect competition on the credit market, AO is equivalent to assuming a
single lender (a large bank) that breaks even in equilibrium because it faces the threat of entry from
other financial  institutions  and has  a fixed  cost.  In a decentralized  equilibrium  under assumption
AO,  lenders end up being price setters.  To clarify the analysis we will details  the timing of events
at T = 0, the contracting stage:
71. Lenders offer interest rate menus to borrowers {r (a), R (BI)}  where  ca  and B are the amounts
borrowed  in pesos and dollars respectively.
2.  Borrowers  make their portfolio choices  {a,  3}  accordingly.
3.3.1  The Central Bank'sI  Reaction Function
The  Central  Bank  observes  financial  contracts  signed  at  time  T  0.  Such  contracts  consist  of
a portfolio  composition  {ca, ,)  with corresponding  interest  rates {r, R}.  From now on,  we  define
T =  1 level  of  peso liabilities  as d  cer and  similarly  for  dollar  liabilities:  D  =_ R.  As  lenders
always  break-even  in  equilibrium,  the  second-best  exchange  rate  policy  is  given  by  the  Central
Bank's T =  1 first-order  conditions, i.e.
0 +  Lt  ()  , (s,  D) . (5)
The regularity  conditions  assumed previously  imply that for any non-negative  level of dollar-debt,
the  exchange  rate  response  is well-defined,  continuous  and  differentiable  with respect  to  D.  We
henceforth  denote  the exchange  rate response  to  a level  D of dollarization  SD,  while  dD is  the
corresponding level of peso-debt.  Indeed, the implicit function theorem,  our technology assumptions
and the balance-sheet  effect imply  that, for any D > 0,
(dSD  _  LSD (SD,D)  <O,  (6)
dD J D  L4, 8 (SD, D) - ((SD)
making  SD a decreasing function  of dollar-debt.
In this world, the Central Etank values  a devaluation  more than entrepreneurs  do, which induces
a depreciation bias in exchange  rate policy.  In particular,  for D = 0, the Central Bank's first-order
condition implies that the second-best  is characterized  by excess  devaluation,  which leads to higher
interest  payments.  To see  this, consider  the break even condition  for so,
rdo
do =  1 +  F (Ylso, 0)  dY.
The optimality condition  for the first-best exchange  rate policy implies that for any Y E R+,
F(YsFB,O) < F (YI5o, O),
implying  a premium on peso-debt:
do > dFB.
The first-best exchange rate policy translates  into a distribution of output that first-order stochas-
tically  dominates  the  distribution  generated  by  a  second-best  exchange  rate  policy.  Thus  the
premium on peso-debt is lower in the former case  as default is less frequent  and repayment  in case
of default is higher.
3.3.2  Agents'  Portfolio  Choices
We restrict the set of contracts to menus such that r and R are continuously  differentiable  functions
of the amounts borrowed, a and fl  respectively.  Furthermore,  we restrict menus so that repayments
8are increasing  functions of amounts borrowed:  Va,,8 > 0,
r (a) + ar' (a) > 0,  7
R (3) +,BRr  (,)  >Ž.  (7)
As dollar  and peso loans  are perfect substitutes as far as production  and consumption  are con-
cerned, we have that in equilibrium a+,8 = 1. Agents therefore face a menu {r (a), R (1 -
and choose the currency  denomination of their debt payments  to minimize  expected  payments  in
T = 2
minr(a)a +  R(1 - a)  (1-  a)
Then, indexing  equilibrium outcomes by SB,  we have for  an interior solution:
r (a SB)  + ceSBr  (CESB)  =  (1 +  SDSB)  [R (1 -_  SB)  +  (1-  CSB) R' (1-  a'S)]  (8)
The optimal portfolio  choice  equalizes  the marginal cost of an extra  peso borrowed  with the cost
of an  extra dollar borrowed.  Under  conditions  assumed  in  (7),  agents'  optimal  portfolio  choices
{  SB  1 _  aSE} are uniquely  defined, so that either aSB =  0,  or aSB = 1 or  (8) holds.
3.3.3  Lenders' Interest Rate Decision
Given  the borrowers'  reaction  function  (8),  the  choice  of interest  rates menus  {r (.),R (.)}  pins
down  the choice of debt portfolios  {d, D}, where for any menus {r (.),  D (.)},  d = aSBr (aSB)  and
D =  (1 - aSB) R  (1 - aSB) . Equilibrium interest rate choices then maximize  expected repayments
to lenders,  or equivalently,  expected  output:
(dSB, DSB).= argmaxExY  (XIsD, D) =  arg max {m +  OSD - L(SD, D)}  (9) d,D  d,D
subject to
D  >  0  (10)
d+(l+SD)D
d+(1+SD)D  =  1+10  F (YISD, D) dY  (11)
and the Central Bank's reaction function  SD:
0 + t'  (SD)  =  L.  (SD, D)  (12)
Under  assumption AO,  lenders indeed internalize  the Central Bank's reaction  function.  Given that
(12)  defines  a  continuously  differentiable  exchange  rate response  from the Central  Bank,  agents'
first-order  conditions  for an interior solution can now be written:
(dD  DSB  [0- L.  (SDSB,  Ds)]  = LD (SDSB,  DSB)  (13)
Furthermore,  the  break-even  condition  (11)  binds and  thus determines  the level  of peso-debt  ac-
cording to
SB  SB  x~~~~dSB+ (l+SDsB)DSB  B(4
dSB +  (1 + SDSB)  DSB  = 1 +  j  )  F (YISDSB,  DSB) dY.  (14)
9The trade-off captured in (:[3)  weighs the marginal benefits of increasing dollar liabilities against
the corresponding  losses.  These benefits arise  from reductions  in the devaluation-related  distortion,
as measured by the left-hand side of (13).  An increase in dollar-denominated  debt puts a downward
pressure  on  exchange  rate  policy,  which  is  then  reflected  in  productivity  gains.  This  effect  is
illustrated  in figure  (3).  The first  panel of the figure  corresponds  to  (12),  and shows  the marginal
costs and benefits for the central bank of a devaluation at two levels of dollar-debt:  0 and DSB.  The
lower panel shows the expecte(d  output that follows from the Central Bank's best response for each
level  of dollarization.  As  can  be seen in the figure  agents  trade off the  direct  costs of dollar-debt
(the downward  shift in the E,Y curve  due to LD  > 0)  against  the benefits  of a less  expansionary
exchange  rate policy.
While equilibrium  portfolios  of liabilities  (dsB, DSB)  are uniquely  determined,  a multitude  of
financial contracts  can achieve  such outcome.  Thus,  we make a further assumption on equilibrium
conditions,  the  "no arbitrage"  condition:  any equilibrium  menus of interest  rates must satisfy
r (cSB)  = (1 + SDSB)  R (1_aSB) . (15)
Under condition  (15),  when interest  rates on a peso is equal to devaluation-adjusted  interest rates
on a dollar, equilibrium portfolio choices and interest rates are thus uniquely determined.  Note that
off-equilibrium  interest rates  are not necessarily  unique.  The following  proposition summarizes  the
results obtained so far:
Proposition  1  The optimization program (9)  under constraints (10) and (11) has a unique solu-
tion (dSB, DSB)  such that the first-order necessary and sufficient condition
(dsD>.  _B]S
(dD  d  SB  [0- L,  (SDsB,DSB)]  D  LD  (SDSB, DSB)
in which for any x, D, ( dSD'_  LSD (SD, D)
dD J  D  L.  (SD, D)-  (SD)'
and the break even condition
dSB + (1+  SDSB)  DSB -1±  dSB+(1+sDSB)DSB  F  (YISDSB,  DSB) dY
holds.
Furthermore, interest rates and portfolio decisions are defined by
r(aSB)  dSB
R (1-oaSB)  =  DSB
such that if  the  "no-arbitrage" condition (15) .holds then  the first-order condition for  borrowers
determines a unique portfolio choice aSB:
cSBr  (aSB) =  (1 + SDSB)  (1a-  ) R  (1 - )
Proof.  We  just need  to prove  that the  solution is indeed interior.  Under the Inada conditions
assumed previously,  we  observe that for D = 0
( dD  )  O  -0  L,  (so,  O)] > LD (SO,  O)
which implies that program (9)  has an interior solution.  -
103.4  Some  comments
In this model, dollar  liabilities have a disciplining effect  on the government.  Lenders  price interest
rates on peso and dollar-debt  in such a way that agents take on dollar-debt,  which then obliges  the
government  not to devaluate excessively.  To see this,  let's consider the break-even  condition  (14)
dSB  +  (1  + SDSB)  D  SB  =  1  + fo  djSB  F  (YISDS+,  DSB ) dY)
and let's compute  the effect  of an increase  in  dollar-denominated  liabilities  on  the denomination
of peso-debt  . After noting that F (YIs, D) is  continuously  differentiable  in  (s, D) uniformly  with
respect to Y > 0,  we apply  the implicit function  theorem to (14),
(dD  )  =  -(1 + SDSB)  (16)
(dSD )B  DSB x F  (dSB +  (1 +  SDSB)  DSB)
1 - F (dSB + (1 + SDSB) DSBISDSB, DSB)  (17)
fdSB+(1+BDSB)D  [S  (YISBSDSB)] dY
L  ITD-(YISDSB,D  )jdY  ~~~~~(18)
1 - F  (dSB + (1 +  SDSB) DSBISDSB, DSB)
Increasing  the level of dollar-denominated  debt payments  affects  peso payments  through:
*  An accounting effect (right-hand side of (16)):  from an accounting perspective dollar-denominated
liabilities  are  substitutes for  peso-debt;  taking one extra  unit of dollar-debt  allows  firms to
reduce  their peso payments  by 1 + SDSB.
*  A  disciplining effect or risk-premium effect (captured in (17) and  (18)):  an increase  in dollar-
denominated  liabilities,  by  inducing  a relatively  more  pro-output  exchange  rate  policy  de-
creases the risk-premium  as it lowers the probability of default  (term in (17))  and at the same
time increases  repayments  in states  of nature  where default occurred  (term in (18)).
The idea that dollarization  has  a disciplining  effect on Central Banks  when  there  is incentive
mismatch is not new (see, for example Borenzstein et al (1996),  Chang and Velasco  (2001),  Gale and
Vives  (2002),  or Tirole  (2002)).  Similar arguments  have been made to support  the introduction  of
government  debt indexed to the exchange rate or inflation.  In most cases,  however cost and benefit
analyses  of dollarization  consider dollarization  as a policy variable.
The focus so  far  of the paper has been instead  to investigate  how markets,  by setting  interest
rates on peso and dollar-debt,  provide  incentives to investors  to choose their portfolio  composition
in order to mitigate the  effects of a misalignment  of incentives between  Central Banks and agents.
In order  for  this effect  to hold,  we  assume  that coordination  is  taking  place  between  lenders,  so
that the disciplining  effect is  internalized.  Indeed,  lenders  incorporate the  fact that an additional
dollar  liability has  a disciplining  effect  on the  Central  Bank - thus  decreasing  the probability  of
default - so that they  are willing to make dollar  loans  cheaper  relatively to peso  loans8. Is this a
81n Tirole  (2002),  as interest  rates for  dollar debt  axe fixed  at international rates,  the decentralized  equilibrium
does not internalized the disciplining  effect, potentially yielding under-dollarization  of liabilities.  Not allowing interest
11valid assumption?  Table  (1)  shows  one  measure  of bank concentration  for  a sample  of emerging
market economies  from three regions:  Latin America,  East Asia  and Eastern Europe.  In all regions
the  three largest  banks  concentrate  over  50%  of  total bank  assets,  suggesting  that  coordination
amongst domestic  lenders  is indeed feasible.
In this  complete  information  setting,  portfolio  choices  are optimal.  Expected  output  is  maxi-
mized,  or  equivalently,  the probability of low realizations  of output,  or crises, is minimized.  In the
following sections, we will investigate mechanisms that provide a rationale for a suboptimal portfolio
composition  leading to  excess d.ollarization.  In particular  we discuss  the implications  of imperfect
knowledge  about the parameters  of the model - specifically  the preferences  and  effectiveness  of the
Central Bank.
It is important to emphasize that in this model, debt denominated in dollars is strictly equivalent
to debt denominated in pesos contingent on the exchange rate.  Indeed,  pesos and dollars are perfect
substitutes as far  as current consumption  is concerned.  Moreover,  under  purchasing  power parity,
dollar debt  is an inflation-indexed  peso-debt.
4  A Signaling Model  of Central Bank Credibility
Consider  now  that  some  characteristics  of the economy  are  unknown  to agents,  and  that  they
therefore learn about the parameters of the economy.  To be more specific,  assume that agents have
imperfect knowledge  about  m,  the mean  of the distribution  of i;  the  Central  Bank's effectiveness
at  smoothing  macroeconomic  shocks  0;  and  the  devaluation  bias  0 (.).  Hence,  the parameters
(m,  0, 0)  E  M  x E  x  1  are  unknown,  while  we  assume  that other  functional  forms,  such  as the
distributions  and  the function  L (.),  are perfectly  known  to agents9. To simplify the  analysis,  we
will assume that the Central  Bank can have only two types
*  a "good"  type, 09 (.), where  09(.)  = 0.
*  a  "bad"  type  ob (,),  where  ob (.) is increasing  and concave.
Thus, the set of possible Central Bank's types is reduced to b  =  {09,  b)}  . Although our analysis
will  hold  irrespective  of what  type  is  the true  type,  for  the  policy  relevance  of our  argument,
we  will  assume  that  the  Central  Bank  does  not  exhibit  a devaluation  bias  and  hence  is of type
{m
9 ,  0 9,  9 (.)}.  The plausibility  that the  true  type  could  be  type  b  is  the starting  point  of our
discussion on Central Bank's credibility.
Moving  away  from the static  framework,  we  now  consider  dynasties  of entrepreneurs.  Each
dynasty,  in  generation  t  >  0,  is  endowed  with  some  priors  t (m, 8, 0)  about  the  values  of the
parameters  of the  economy.  For  any  t  >  0,  dynasty-(t +  1)  agents'  priors  are equal to  dynasty-
t  agents'  posteriors.  The transmission  of  information  is  then  as  follows.  For  any  t >  0,  given
rates  on peso  and dollar  to adjust  in order to reflect  the relative  forces  involved  lead most models  to end  up with
polar cases,  as in Chamon  and Hausnmann  (2002):  either  the economy fully dollarizes  (D =  ca)  and  the Central  Bank
fixes,  i.e.  s = 0, or the economy  borrows essentially  in domestic currency  (D = 0) and  the  Central Bank  floats,  i.e.
5  =  so
9Priors  ti, (.) are probability measures  over M x ex 41.  Equivalently  we could have assumed, without  altering our
results, that agents  where uncertain  about the the function  L.
12their priors  ut (m, 0, 0), agents  choose a contract  (dt, Dt), the Central  Bank sets an exchange  rate
depreciation  St and the output is realized according to the stochastic process  defined by (1).  While
they  do  not  observe  the realization  of  i,  agents  observe  the  exchange  rate  and  realized output
and  update  their beliefs  accordingly.  They  then bequeath  their  beliefs  to  the next  generation.
As  in the static  version  of the  model  the exchange  rate is normalized  to one for T  =  0  of  each
generation.  We assume that there is no savings technology,  so that all output  in a given generation
is consumed.  However,  there  is some intergenerational  altruism  so that the  Central  Bank  as well
as agents maximize  a discounted  flow of payoffs, with  discount factor J.  We  assume that J  is the
same for agents and the Central Bank and that this property  is common  knowledge.
At  this stage it  is  useful  to provide  a brief description  of the main  results  we obtain  in  this
section.  The first of these is trivial:  given that agents choose  the level of dollar-debt based on their
priors regarding  Central  Bank preferences,  imperfect  information  will  always lead  to inefficiently
high  levels  of  dollarized  debt.  The  key  issue  then  becomes  how  these  priors  evolve  over  time.
Assuming that Central  Banks  can  affect  learning  by  signaling their  types  leads us  to our second
result.  The learning  process  can  be  characterized  by  two  possible  outcomes:  a  pooling  and  a
separating  equilibrium.
*  In the pooling equilibrium  each generation  updates their beliefs based on the observed  values
of the  exchange  rate and  output.  Learning  is  imperfect,  however,  as  agents  only  have  two
equations  ((1)  and  (5))  to identify  three parameters.  They  observe  output but  do not know
how much is due to the macroeconomic  component,  x,  and how much  is due to the monetary
component,  Os;  similarly,  while  they  observe  the exchange  rate  level  s,  agents  do not  know
whether the Central Bank has a high ability to increase productivity (hig value of 0) or it has
a large seignorage  motive (steep 0 (.)).  The result  is that economies  can be stuck in persistent
states of high dollar-debt  when agents wrongly attribute the observed outcomes to a Central
Bank of type-b.
*  In the separating equilibrium  the  full information  outcome  (D =  0) ensues  in every  period
after separation.
Which equilibria  is selected  will depend on the costs to the  Central Bank of playing a signaling
strategy.  Our third main result  is that  this cost  depends on the initial level of dollarization,  itself
driven by  agents'  priors about  the Central  Bank.  If the initial level of dollar-debt  is too high the
Central Bank  will decide to induce coordination on the pooling  equilibrium.  The intuition behind
this  result  is  straight-forward:  dollarization  narrows  the  wedge  between  the  optimal  policies  of
"good"  and  "bad"  central banks, making it harder for a good Central Bank to distinguish  itself.  In
the final  subsection  we relate this result to borrowers  behavior.  If initial  priors are  "bad"  enough
then dollar-debt  will be high leading  the  Central  Bank  to  select the pooling equilibrium.  On the
other extreme,  "good" priors will lead to the signaling equilibrium and efficient levels of dollar debt.
An interesting  outcome occurs in the intermediate  region.  If priors  are good  enough,  then agents
may have incentives to take on less dollar-debt  than a static game suggests if this leads the Central
Bank to a choose the separating  equilibrium.
The rest  of this section  proceeds  as follows.  We start by  characterizing  the pooling equilibria
and  the updating  process.  In  the following  subsection  we  characterize  the separating  equilibria.
We finish  by analyzing  the optimal  strategies  of the Central  Bank and individual  agents.
134.1  Signaling  Game:  deflinition
In this  section,  we analyze  the ability of the Central Bank to signal to the markets its  willingness
to conduct  a  "good"  exchange iate policy.  We start by defining the signalling  game that Central
Banks and  agents  are playing.  In this standard overlapping generation  model, for each generation
T > 0, the Central  Bank of type  (m, 9, 0) has expected payoffs
W, (T)  = E  [(i  + OSt)  +  ' (St)  - L (st, Dt)] ,
t>T
while agents  maximize  payoffs
W (T) = EM-T  Z  jt-T  [E., (m +  OSt)  - L (St, Dt)] .
t>T
While agents choose a sequence of financial  contracts  (dt, Dt)t>o,  Central Banks choose a sequence
of exchange  rate regimes  (st)t>o.  The question  is now to investigate  whether  the  "good"  Central
Bank can  signal her type to markets.
While  a complete  analysis  oi  the signaling game is not  the purpose  of this section,  we analyze
conditions  of existence  of a separating  equilibrium,  and characterize  the  pooling  equilibria  in  a
dynamic learning  game.  Thus,  we restrict  attention  to stationary  strategies,  adopting  a Markov
perfect equilibrium  concept.
4.2  Pooling  Equilibria: C!haracterization
When  the only  possible equilibiia  are pooling  equilibria,  agents have imperfect  knowledge  about
the parameters  of the economy.  This section characterizes the behavior of agents' beliefs along an
infinite sequence of pooling equilibria.  The issue of whether such sequence  exists will be discussed
some paragraphs below.  As a common feature of these models is to exhibit many pooling equilibria,
we restrict  attention to the best sequence  of pooling equilibria,  so that off-equilibrium  beliefs  are
somewhat  "reasonable".
4.2.1  Equilibrium  Characterization and the TEansmission  of Information
Building on the results of section  3, the sequence  (dt, Dt) of financial contracts verifies:  Vt  > 0,
(dt,Dt) E argmaxE,.t {Es  [Y (zls,  D) Im,9, 0]}  (19)
d,D
subject  to:
* the  Central Bank's reaction function:  V  (m, 0, 0) E Supp (i),
0 + e (s) = L. (s,  D).  (20)
*  and lenders'  break-even  condition:
d+(l+a)D
d + (14- s) D = 1 + Ep]  . . F (Ylm, 0, s, D) dY.  (21)
14Existence  and uniqueness  of such  contracts  is given  by regularity  properties considered  previ-
ously.  Note that under the assumed regularity conditions,  d (.),  and D (.)  are continuous functions.
Some additional  points on the notation:  instead  of considering  the random  variable z,  we will
focus on  Y  - +  Os - L (s, D) . F (.Im, 9, s, D) wiU refer  to the distribution  function of Y,  were
(m, 9,4')  the true  parameters  and  (s, D) is  given  by  the  Central Bank's  reaction  function  (20),
while D is agents' choice of dollarization.  Finally, dG (.Im, 9, 4')  denotes the conditional distribution
function of the pair (Y, s).
We now turn to the learning process per se.  Agents update their information  rationally,  so that
Bayes' rule  induces the following  transition process:  V (m, 0, 0) E Supp (Pt)
It+, (m, 0, q|R, s) = A  (m, 9, 4)  dG (R, slm,  0,  ')  )  (22)
dG (R, sIm', 9', 4") A't(i,9,4)  2)
(m',6',0')EMX9X1D
While the transition  process is well-defined,  the evolution of beliefs is  ambiguous.  When agents
observe a high  realization  of output,  they can either update their beliefs  so that higher  values  of
m are  more  likely,  or  so that  the  Central  Bank  has  a larger  impact  on  output  (i.e.  0  is  large).
Similarly,  a given  devaluation  can be attributed  either  to an effective  Central  Bank  (high  9)  or a
large objective  mismatch  (0'(.) =  #'  (.) > 0).  As such priors  condition the choice  of dollarization,
one  can  now  guess  what  is likely  to  happen:  starting with  priors that  the Central Bank  has  no
positive  impact on  the output  function,  agents  will take  on large  amounts of dollar  debt,  taking
exchange rate policy off the hands of "supposedly ineffective"  Central Bankers.  Any high realization
of output is then attributed  to large exogenous  demand shocks.  Similarly,  starting with priors that
the Central  Bank has  a strong preference  for  devaluation  (0'(.)  = 4b"  (.)  >  0)  agents  will  take on
dollar  debt to  avoid  excessive devaluation.  Low  realizations  of s are  seen as the  response to  the
dollar  debt and not a confirmation  of low devaluation preferences.
4.2.2  Limit Beliefs and Actions
We  can then characterize  the set of limit beliefs and actions  along an infinite sequence  of pooling
equilibria.  The first result  is that the process  defined  by  (22)  converges  with  probability  one to
some  limit beliefs  that  we  denote  p.  (m, 0, 0).  The property  is standard  to Bayesian  learning.
As  expected  posteriors  are  equal  to the  priors  (any  bias would  be  incorporated  into  the  prior),
the learning  process  has  the martingale  property,  and thus  converges  with probability  1.  Then,
equations  (20)  and  (21)  imply  by  continuity  that  dollarization  levels  and  exchange  rate  policy
variables  also converge  with probability  1 to some values  Doo, dOOand  sOO.
Lemma 2  For any initial distribution of beliefs AO (.), the process (/.t)t>o defined by  (22)  converges
almost surely to some  limit beliefs  o  (.).  The processes (Dt)t>o,  (dt)t>o,  and (st)t>o converge
almost surely to some limit actions Doo = D (A.),  doo = d (A.), and s., = s (It.) respectively.
Proof.  In the text.  n
It is  worth investigating  whether  the argument  made  in the previous paragraph  indeed holds.
In cases  where initial  priors are such that  (m
9 , 09,  09)  E Supp (AO),  a necessary  characteristics  of
limit beliefs  is given in the following proposition:
15Proposition 3  For any initial distribution of beliefs  1to (.)  such  that (m9, 09, 09)  E  Supp (yo),
along an infinite sequence of pooling equilibria, limit beliefs  u  (.)  and actions Doo, doo and s.. are
characterized  by:
a  (m9 ,  09, 09 ) E Supp (M.)
E  IE  (i,  9b  ,b)  e  Supp (  ) ,then
ob + ob, (s.)  =  9g,  (23)
and
mb + obs.= mg  +  g 9s.  (24)
Proof.  The proof uses a standard argument in the  Bayesian learning literature (see  e.g.  Smith
and Sorensen, 2000).  First, consider the process generated  by Bayes' rule (22):  stationary beliefs
imply that any (m, 0, 0 (.))  and (m', 9', ¢' (.))  in Supp (IL..)  must verify for any feasible (Y, s)  E R
dG (Y, s|Im, 0, ¢ (.))  = dG (Y, sLm',  ',  ' (.))w,hich implies that dF (YIm, 0, 0 (.))  = dF (YIm', O', O'
As these two distributions differ only with respect to their means, (24)  must hold.  Moreover, x and
s  are related by  the central bank's reaction  function (20),  thus stationarity holds only ij  (23)  holds.
Sufficiency can easily be checked.  The second part of the argument is to notice that the likelihood ra-
tio At (m,  9,  0 ())  tt (Mn,  9, 0 (0))  Iut (m
9, 99, 0- 9 (.))  has the martingale  property.  Thus it converges
with probability 1, which implies that p.  (m9, 09, q9 (.))  > 0.  c
The  lack  of identification  is  precisely  why  learning  does  not  occur.  Agents  potentially  face
imperfect  learning  as they only have two equations  ((23)  and (24))  to identify the three parameters
(rn, o, ol (s)).
4.2.3  Comments
Along a  sequence  of pooling  equilibria,  agents  can  be stuck  in persistent  states  where they  have
imperfect knowledge  about the parameters of the economy.  If agents believe that the Central Bank
objectives  differ  from  social  welfare  (i.e.  0(.)  >  0),  they will  take on a  large  amount  of dollar-
denominated  debt.  In turn  the  Central  Bank  reacts  in  such  a way  that  it  does  not  contradict
agents'  beliefs.  Then,  observing  realized  output, agents  can potentially attribute  all the difference
to the exogenous  demand  shock  :r.  High output  can  be interpreted  as  a high  value  of m while
keeping priors about  0 constant.  On the other hand,  agents can attribute low output not to a bad
productivity shock  but  to bad behavior  from the  Central  Bank  (steep 0(.)  >  0).  In the long-run,
experience  is entirely  consistent with expectation and no additional learning takes place.  Countries
can therefore  be locked in  "dollarization  traps",  putting themselves  in situations where low output
is more  likely to occur  and attributing crises to bad governance  of monetary policy,  while at the
same time tying the hands of potentially  potent  (and beaning)  policy makers.
4.3  Separating Equilibria: Characterization
As  we  only  focus  on  Markov  perfect  equilibria,  we  will  analyze  the  conditions  for  existence  of
separating  equilibria at time t =  0.  As agents observe the Central Bank's exchange rate policy and
the realization  of output, we can state the first result:
16Lemma  4  Along any equilibrium path, Vt  > 0,  the following holds:
E n Supp (pt)  C  {,  g99  },  (25)
M n Supp (/l=)  c  {mb, m9},  (26)
where
ob + o  (St)  =  09,  (27)
mb + ObS..  =  m9 +  9s.  (28)
Proof.  As  agents observe  the exchange rate adopted by  the  Central Bank,  such choice must be
consistent uwith  (20),  so that (27)  must hold. Note that ¢9 =  0.  Furthermore, in the long run,  the
mean oj F (.Is.,,  D.0)  is perfectly known  to agents so that (28)  must hold.  U
If  complete  separation  is  achieved  at  any  point  in  time,  then  separation  is  sustained  in  all
subsequent  periods,  and corresponding  subgames  are characterized  by full-information  outcomes.
Indeed  if  separation  occurs,  then  agents  know  perfectly  the type  of the  Central  Bank  they  are
facing;  optimal  portfolio  composition ensues.  The second preliminary result can thus be stated as
follows:
Lemma  5  Consider an equilibrium sequence of exchange rate regimes (St)t>o.
If there exists T  > 0,  such that
E  [lT+1  (m,  O9,  OgIST)]  =  1,
mEM
then, for any t > T +  1,
Dt = 0,  and st = sol
where  sg  is the exchange  rate response of a  Central Bank of type g.
If  there exists T  > 0,  such that
E  [AT+1  (M>0  O,+  I'ST)]=1
mEM
then, for anyt >T+1,
Dt = Db,  and st  D)
where sb  is the exchange rate response for a Central Bank of type b.
Proof.  In the text.  -
As  we restrict  attention  to stationary  strategies,  we can  consider,  without  loss  of generality,
the game played  at time T = 0.  We will  henceforth  restrict ourselves  to initial priors  which verify
(25)  to  (28).  Denoting  by  Do,  the  initial level  of dollarization  adopted  by agents,  and  (ag  G`b  )
the exchange  rate  regimes  adopted  in  period  t =  0  by  Central  Banks  of each  of the types  (g, b)
respectively.  Note that under  condition  (3),  Central  Banks'  preferences  satisfy the single-crossing
property. The short-term cost of limiting monetary expansion is larger for a Central  Bank of type b
than it is for a Central Bank of type g.  Separating equilibria are then characterized  by the following
conditions:
17*  Optimality  for type-b Central Banks:  VDo  > 0,
b  b
UDo  =  SDo
*  Central Bank's reaction function  (equation  (23)):
sb  =  sD
* Incentive-compatibility  constraint  for type-b Central  Banks:
[Obsb  -L  (sb  , Do)  + 0 (  - [o  - L  (aDo)  +  (o)]  (29)
>  6  { [0b8b -L  (sb, O) + 0 (sb)]  [ob5b  - L (sb , D) + 0  (Sb  )] }
Separation  requires  a  depressed  exchange  rate,  so that a  Central  Bank  of type  b is  not  will-
ing to  mimic  a Central  Bank  of type  g.  The  single-crossing  property  ensures that the  incentive-
compatibility  constraint  for  type  g  Central  Banks  holds.  As  we did  for  the  analysis  of pooling
equilibria,  and  to simplify  further discussions,  we will  assume that off-equilibrium  beliefs  are rea-
sonable,  selecting as unique separating equilibrium,  the outcome such that (29)  holds with equality:
a Central Bank of type g  will choose an exchange  rate regime  which is  the least costly,  given that
(29)  must hold.
4.4  Equilibrium Concept  and Equilibrium Outcome
4.4.1  Equilibrium Refinement
Imposing  strategies  to be stationary  implies that the  equilibrium  is Markov  Perfect.  However,  we
have seen in the previous paragraphs, that for any initial level  of debt Do, pooling and separating
equilibria could coexist,  while voluntarily  ignoring  semi-separating  equilibria.  We further  adopted
a domination-based  refinement  of beliefs,  which consisted  of assuming  that  off-equilibrium  beliefs
were reasonable,  as they  clo  not assign positive  probability  to a player  taking  a  strictly dominated
action.  Thus,  in  the  pooling  equilibrium,  no  action  that  is  not  short-term  optimal  was  ruled
out;  similarly,  in separating  equilibria,  any  action that made (29)  hold strictly  was  considered  as
unreasonable.
However,  refinements  such  as  the  Cho-Kreps  intuitive  criterion  (see  Cho  and  Kreps,  1987)
consistently  select  as unique  equilibrium  outcome  the best separating  equilibrium  as described  in
the previous paragraph.  VWe  will thus depart from this refinement  and  adopt a Pareto-dominance-
based  equilibrium  concept;:  agents coordinate on the Pareto-dominating  equilibrium.  We  believe
that such refinement  is relevant for the situation we are modeling:  a Central Bank of type g might
not want  to play  an expe:nsive  signaling  strategy  if the costs  compared  to  a  pooling  equilibrium
situation are large.
4.4.2  Equilibrium Outcome
Under  such  equilibrium  selection  assumption,  the  initial level  of dollarization  Do  determines  the
"cost"  of separation.  When the cost is too high, the Central Bank may decide to induce coordination
on the pooling equilibrium.  The next proposition  formalizes  the result:
18Proposition  6  There  exists a threshold b  such that for any level Do  of initial dollar-debt level,
we have the following:
*  Ij Do > D,  then the unique equilibrium exhibits pooling strategies at time t =  0.
*  IJ Do < b, then the unique equilibrium is a separating equilibrium.
Proof.  Denoting by  Vp (m, 0, ¢)  and V,  (m, 0, 0)  the continuation values for Central Banks of type
(m, 0, 0),  we first remark that such values do not depend on Do.  Indeed,  the Markov perfection
restriction implies  that these  continuation values depend only on posterior beliefs.  We  can now
compare payoffs  to the Central Banks in the separating and pooling cases.  Under the pooling situa-
tion, the two  types of Central Banks receive
EA.  {(1  -6)  [m + OSDO - L  (sDo, Do) +  0 (sD.)] +  3Vp (mi,  0,)}X
while the separating situation yields
Em.  {(1 - 3)  [m +  0aDo  - L  (aD,,  Do) + 0  (orD,)]  +  6V8 (i,  9,  q!>)}-
Thus a  separating equilibrium forms if  and only ij
(1l-3)  E,Ho {m9  + 99 (S9D  - a  - [L (sg,  Do)  - L  (aer,, Do)] }  (30)
<  6Ep,s  {  [is (i
9
,  9  9)  + V 8 (ma, 9 b, Xb)]  _  [vp (i
9 , 09, 09) +  VP (mb,  ob, ob)]  }.
In  other words,  the  short-term losses due to  costly  signaling outweigh  the long-term gains of  an
unconstrained  optimal portfolio composition.  Considering that (29)  binds, we  can rewrite (30)  as
(e@  -0  9)  (s  -D Do  + X (sg  )  - 0  (ao)  <  A,  (31)
where  A  is  given  by  the parameters of the  model  and  is  independent oj  Do.  Applying  the  im-
plicit function theorem to (29),  we  can conclude after observing that (2)  holds, that the difference
S9-a  O)g  is  continuously increasing in  Do  and (Do  DO)an
Dloimo  (SDo  aDo,  += 0
There exists D  E  R,  such that (31)  holds if  and only ij Do < b. For large enough values oj 3,  we
haveD>0.  m
The intuition  of the result can be found in the  proof, yet some comments can be helpful.  The
whole  objective of dollarization  is to narrow the wedge  created by the inflationary  bias of a Central
Bank of type  b. Thus,  as dollarization  levels  increase,  the second-best  solution  for  Central  Banks
g and b get  closer and  closer.  Thus,  in order to discriminate  the two types,  it is  necessary for the
type-g  Central Bank to inflict itself a large cost, in order to deter mimicking from a type-b Central
Bank (condition  (29)).  Thus,  as dollarization  increase,  the cost of getting a separating equilibrium
increases,  eventually  making the separating payoff worse  than the  pooling case,  so that (30) holds.
We  now  turn to  borrowers'  behavior.  Depending  on  their priors,  agents  may or  may not  be
willing to lower their level of dollarization  at time T =  0 in order to obtain a separating equilibrium.The willingness to experiment  depends on the perceived costs  and benefits at the beginning of the
period.  For any beliefs pt (.), we then denote,  by abuse of notation,  At  'iEmEM [I  I  (i,  0, ¢,10b, Xb)]
the prior that the Central Bank is of type b. We conclude the paragraph with the following important
result:
Proposition  7  There exists  a threshold A, such that an equilibrium with separating strategies at
time t = 0 exists if and only ij juo  < A.
Proof.  Agents trade-off the expected loss of having a low level oj dollar-debt level with the expected
gains  from better information as a separating  equilibrium can be achieved.  Consider the initial  level
of dollar debt b. Payofls to borrowers in the separating case are given by
{(1-6) IEHomb + O'D-  L (s%, b)] + 6 [E,Omb + 0bSb , - L  (S%b,  Db)] }
+ (1-  A0)  {(1 - 3)  [EIom9 + 09aD - L (oD,,  3)] + 6 [E/Om  +  s  SO] },  (32)
while,  sticking to a pooling equilibrium strategy, agents would get
m ax E,,. { (1-6) [m + 0sv  -L  (s9  , Do)  ] + 6 [Vp (m, 0,k)]}  (3)
Rearranging  the two  equations (32)  and (33),  a separating  strategy brings short-term losses equal to
1maxD 0 [Eom±0sDo  L(DO)DO),  31
L  -{/1  [E,yomb + eb4 -L(SD,D)]+(1- 1 0)  [E,Om9+094 _L (b,  D)] }  |l(3
while long-term gains are given by
, [ i'o  [170 mb +  ODbS  -L  (Db  D)] + (1 -A)  [EAom
9g  S  ]  (35)
-Ejo [Vp (m, 0, 0/)]I
Applying Jensen's inequality to (34)  and (35),  we  see that short-term losses are an increasing (and
concave) function oj yo,  while long-term gains are a decreasing (and convex) function oj /1o.  Thus,
there exists A E [0,1],  s:uch that for any initial beliefs  po,
Do> D <-*  uo >A
These  results  can  well  be  summarized  in  figure  (4).  The horizontal  line  graphs  AO,  agents'
priors  that  the  Central  Bank  is of type  b.  A  high  value  of  Mo  thus indicates  a low  credibility.
The vertical axis plots the corresponding  initial levels of dollar-denominated  liabilities.  The dotted
line  is  the  linearized  one-period  optimal  level  of dollar-debt,  while  the plain  line  is  the dynamic
optimal  level.  Although the true  type  is  09 (.),  yet  agents set  off with  "bad"  priors  about the
Central  Bank,  not only don't they wish to experiment and give authorities a chance to prove their
good  behavior,  but they take on  high levels of dollar-debt,  which  makes  separating  equilibria not
sustainable  (right).  With  "better"  priors about the parameters  of the economy,  agents are willing
to experiment,  taking  oln  smaller  dollar denominated  loans than their priors would  have suggested
in a static game  (center).  Finally,  when dollarization  levels are low  anyway, experimentation  does
not involve any additional cost in terms of short-term suboptimal portfolio composition  (left).
204.4.3  Equilibrium  Dynamics
In  the  previous  paragraphs,  we  characterized  pooling  and  separating  equilibria.  We  have  seen
that once separation occurs  at a given period,  then there  is separation  ever after,  and dollar-debt
holdings are unconstrained-optimal.  Given that the true type of the Central Bank is 09 (.) =  0 the
question is  to  know whether  and  under what  conditions  imperfect  learning  can  arise.  Obviously,
if agents  start  with single-valued  priors,  no  learning  takes  place  and  they  keep  these priors  for
ever.  Similarly,  if agents put a zero-probability  on the true parameters  (m9 , 09, 09)  then, imperfect
learning will trivially persist.  Finally,  it is possible  that an economy  which starts with priors  ILO (.)
such that  (m9, 09, 09)  E  Supp (po) will  remain  for  ever  with  such beliefs.  The next proposition
formulates  the result:
Proposition 8  Let's consider some stationary beliefs /loo (.),  along with  an infinite sequence  oj
pooling equilibria, such that (mg
9 , 09,,  9)  E  Supp (tIL)  and it  (.)  verifies (23)  and (24).  For any
initial distribution of beliefs  'o (.),  such that Supp (/.0)  =  Supp (jio),  the following propositions
hold:
*  IJ p0 (m
9 , 09, 49) <  U.  (m
9 , 09, 0g),  then pt  (.)  converges to some stationary beliefs  charac-
terized by  imperfect learning with probability 1.
*  IJ  o (m9, 09, 09)  > ji.  (m9, 99, 09),  then  it (-)  converges to some stationary beliefs charac-
terized by  imperfect learning with positive probability.
Proof.  This proposition is a result proved in McLennan (1984), and replicated in Piketty (1995).
We thus showed that economies  that are very similar in many respects,  can have very different
equilibrium  trajectories.  In any  neighborhood  of A, identical  countries  that  differ  only  by initial
priors can experience  drastically  different  behavior  from  investors.  Under some  conditions  of the
parameters  of the economy,  namely A > A00,  identical countries with identical priors have a positive
probability  to be on  two different  long-run trajectories.
5  Policy Implications
Throughout  this paper we  have discussed cases in which imperfect learning can lead to sub-optimal
levels  of dollarized  liabilities.  Our  argument  therefore  reinforces  the commonly  accepted  wisdom
that  Central  Bank's independence  is  a central element  in a sound monetary  policy.  However,  we
have clear-cut  predictions  as  to the taxation  of dollar-debt.  As discussed  in section  4 dollar-debt
makes  separating  equilibria  costly.  A  tax on  dollar-debt  will  "encourage"  agents  to  lower  their
dollar-debt  holdings  giving the  authorities  a  chance  to prove their  good behavior.  We are  aware
that many of these issues have been discussed extensively in the literature of monetary policy.  Our
contribution  is to emphasize  that dollarization  of liabilities  provides an additional  justification for
providing markets  with the means  to identify the relevant  parameters in the economy.
215.1  Central Bank's Independence and 'TYansparency
Even  though the  case  for  Central  Bank's independence  and  transparency  is not  new,  our paper
reinforces  the argument  by emphasizing  the need to convey  credible information  to markets.  Not
only  does  Central  Bank's independence  mitigate  the  political  economy  issue  at  the  heart  of the
problem  (the  function  0(.))  but  a verifiable  mandate  allows  the  market  to  take  decisions  under
perfect  information,  at  least  along  the  dimension  of  interest  in  this  paper.  In  a  recent  article
regarding  the situation  in  Argentina,  Caballero  and Dornbusch  (2002)  emphasized  this need  for
credibility to overcome  e)isting devaluation  priors:
Specifically,  a  board  of experienced  foreign  central  bankers  should  take  control  of Ar-
gentina's  monetary  policy.  This  would  have  many  of the virtues  of a  currency  board
without  the costs  cf having  to  adopt  a monetary  policy  tailored  to somebody  else's
needs.  The new pesos  should not be printed  on Argentine  soil.
Our paper  makes  the  case  that if  Central  Bank  independence  is  a  first-best  solution,  trans-
parency  is crucial to achieve  the second-best.
5.2  Taxation of Dollar  Liabilities
This section is devoted  to the determination  of the tax policy on dollar  debt that induces  a sepa-
rating equilibrium  to forni at time t.  We  are interested  in looking at the tax policy that a Central
Bank without  devaluation  bias  (i.e.  X (.) = 0,  the  "good"  Central Bank  as we have been referring
to so far)  should adopt  w:hen she  faces  priors pt (.)  about her type.
The timing of the game is the following:
*  The government  obEserves  agents priors  pt (.)  and sets a tax on dollar-debt  Tt.
*  Agents make  their portfolio decisions
*  The Central Bank sets an exchange  rate policy
*  Output is realized,  beliefs are updated and bequeathed.
We assume that tax revenues are redistributed to agents in the form of a lump-sum transfer at
the end  of the period.  W3  also  make the critical  assumption  that a tax level  rt  does not  convey
information  about  the type  of the  Central  Bank  that  agents  may  face.  Thus,  a fiscal  incentive
choice  Tt  is no signaling  device.  In addition,  taxation  adds an additional  distortionary  cost  y  (Tt),
increasing and convex.  Such cost is borne by entrepreneurs.  A simple backward  induction argument
will guide our subsequent  discussion.
5.2.1  A separating tax  incentive
In this paragraph,  we characterize  the fiscal  incentive that the government  should  design in order
to  allow the  "good"  Central  Bank  to build credibility  in the subsequent  period.  The government
22thus internalizes  the behavior of each of the agents in the economy:  given  agents' priors p  (.) and
the tax scheme  rt, debt contracts  are determined by
(dt, Dt) E arg max Et {E.  [Y (xls, D) Im,  O, d>}  -TrtD  (36)
d,D
subject to:
*  A type-b Central  Bank reaction function:
a  =  SD
where VD > 0, SD is defined by
ob + 1t  (SD)  = L.  (SD, D)
*  A type-g Central Bank reaction function  defined by (29):
8=G s  =  orD
*  and lenders'  break-even  condition'o:
td+(l +s)D
E,h [d + (1 + s) D] = 1 + EHt j  F (Ylm, 6, a, D) dY
The first-order  condition gives a dollarization  choice  Dt satisfying:
Emt [(D)  [-  L,(s,Dt)I-LD(s,Dt)] = Tt.  (37)
The  optimal tax policy  is then defined  as the level  of taxation  Tt that  induces  separation  at
lowest cost.  Thus (36)  implicitly  assumed that separation occurs after t. Type-g Central Bank sets
a tax level in order to maximize
max E.  [Y (xZs,  D)] - y (r)  (38)
subject to agents'  reaction  function  (37)
E,t  [(  ds)  [O  L.  (S, Dt)] -LD  (S, DO)  =  rt,  (39) LkdD~  DtJ
the separation  condition:
Dt  < b,  (40)
and the now standard  Central Bank's  reaction function  (12)  and the lender  break-even  condition
(11).
10The  break-even  condition  is  unchanged  as  we  assume  that tax  revenues  are  redistributed  through  lump-sum
transfers,  so that they increase pledgeable  income  by the same amount.
23Additional regularity assumptions on the functions  involved in the model  allow us to apply the
local inversion  theorem to  (37)  in order to get for any Dt < D,
(dDt'  =E  9 (d 2 "  (d2L(s,D)  <1  <0
V dTr  L kdD2 De  dD2 )DtJ
An increase in the level of taxation decreases  the initial level  of dollar-debt that agents  are willing
to take.  Such preliminary  analysis finally yields the first-order  conditions  for  an interior choice  of
a tax level  rt:
(dD)t [d9)D)  [09-  L  (aDt,Dt)1  LD(Orgt,Dt)1  =i-t).  (41)
The government  trades off the distortionary  costs of taxation  (right-hand side of (41)) with the
experimentation costs when dollarization levels are high (left-hand side of (41)).  Indeed, an increase
in the tax rate creates an incremental  distortion, but by decreasing  the initial level of dollarization,
makes  a separating strategy  less costly  in terms  of foregone  short-term productivity.
5.2.2  A pooling  tax incentive
If priors about the Central Bank's  type are bad enough, the equilibrium distortionary  cost of taxa-
tion  y (irt)  might  not be worth  paying.  Yet,  although time t outcome  does not imply separation  of
Central Bank's types, tax incentives are beneficial  as they reduce the distortionary cost of excessive
dollar-denominated  liabilities.  Similarly  to the previous paragraph,  the government  chooses a level
of taxation  rt in order  to solve the program:
max Ex [Y (x|s, D)]-y (T)
subject to agents' reaction  function
[( ds)LD  [E}  ()  -L.  (SD, Dt)] - LD (SD, Dt)]  =Tt,  (42)
and the Central Bank's reaction  function (12)  and the lender break-even  condition  (11).  Note that
in the  pooling case,  agents  expect the Central  Bank to adopt an exchange  rate policy  SD,  defined
regardless  of its  type by  (12).  An  identical  procedure  implies  that  levels  of dollar-denominated
liabilities  decrease when rt increases,  according  to
dr  d'2dD2  <-1
(dDt  )  iEt (9)  ( d2 SD)  D_  - \D)  D  }DJ
so that the type-g  government  now faces the trade-off:
(dDt)rt  [(dsD )D  [09  L,  (Sg  , Dt)]-LD  (Sg  t, Dt)] =  ^  (-rt)  (43)
In this case,  the government  trades off the distortionary  costs  of taxation  (right-hand side of (43))
and the distortionary costs of excess dollarization levels (left-hand side of (43)).  A marginal increase
in the tax rate will create a marginal distortion,  but at the same time will reduce dollarization levels,
relaxing the pressure  on exchange  rate policy.
245.2.3.  Towards  an optimal tax policy
Conditions  (41)  and  (43)  define  the  optimal one-period  tax rate  in  the events  of separation  or
pooling respectively.  Whether  the  government  wants  to  achieve  separation  in the first place  or
delay such intervention then depends  on the equilibrium  path of beliefs and the discount rate 6.  In
the current  version of the draft,  we will not formally characterize  the optimal tax scheme.  Yet,  we
want to provide some intuition regarding  the tensions involved.  A costly  (separating)  intervention
will always be worth undertaking when agents are patient enough.  This being said, the right timing
of the intervention  will  crucially  depend  on the pre-intervention  learning  path.  However,  in cases
where  agents  are eventually  learning,  the implementation  of a separating  tax policy  trades off the
distortionary  losses  of taxation  and  the  the learning  speed.  Thus  if agents  are  learning  quickly
enough,  it might be optimal not to appeal  to separating taxes and restrict  attention to mitigating
short-term  distortions  stemming  from  excess  dollarization.  The reverse  holds  when  agents  are
learning  slowly the true parameters  of the economy  or they  are  not learning  at  all  and  converge
towards  a dollarization  trap.
6  Concluding  Remarks
In this paper,  we  argued that dollarized  liabilities,  by creating a  disciplining effect  on the  Central
Bank,  can help correct  a devaluation bias.  However,  when  information  is imperfect,  the economy
can be stuck in a dollarization trap:  a benevolent Central Bank that lacks credibility  may face high
levels of dollarization,  making  a stabilization monetary  policy hard to implement and, at the same
time,  making it costly to build credibility.  We  analyzed the optimal tax schemes that governments
should design to mitigate the short-term distortions due to excess  levels of dollarized  liabilities and
to allow long-term  learning, thus avoiding  dollarization  traps.
References
[1]  Aghion,  P.,  P.  Bacchetta  and  A.  Banerjee  (2001),  "Currency  Crises  and Monetary  Policy  in
an Economy with Credit Constraints."  European Economic  Review 45(7):  1121-50.
[2]  Arteta, C. 0.  (2002),  "Exchange rate regimes and financial dollarization:  does flexibility reduce
bank currency mismatches?"  International  Finance Discussion Papers 738, Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve  System.
[3]  Balino,  T.,  A.  Bennett  and  E.  Borenzstein  (1999),  "Monetary  Policy  in  a  Dollarized
Economies."  IMF Occasional  Paper 171.
[4]  Beck, T.,  A. Demirgtlc-Kunt,  and R Levine (1999),  "A  New  Database  on Financial  Develop-
ment  and Structure",  Working  Paper 2146,  World Bank.
[5]  Caballero,  R.  and  R..  Dornbusch  (2002),  "Argentina  cannot  be  trusted"  at
http://news.ft.com/ft/gx.cgi/ftc?pagename=View&c=Article&cid=FT3DWX51JYC&live=true
[6]  Calvo,  G.  A.  (2001),  "Capital Markets  and the Exchange  Rate with Special  Reference  to the
Dollarization Debate in Latin America."  Journal of Money,  Credit, and Banking  33(2):  312-34.
[7]  Calvo,  G. A.  (1999),  "On Dollarization."  At http://www.bsos.umd.edu/econ.
25[8]  Calvo G. and C. Reinhart (2002),  "Fear  of Floating."  The Quarterly Journal of Economics 67:
379-408.
[91  Cespedes, L. F., R. Chang and A. Velasco  (2000),  "Balance Sheets and Exchange  Rate Policy."
NBER Working Paper  7840.
[10]  Cespedes,,  L.  F., R.  Cliang  and A.  Velasco  (2002),  "Must  Original  Sin Bring Macroeconomic
Damnation  ?"  Prepared for the conference  on Original Sin and its Consequences,  IADB.
[ill  Chamon,  M.  (2001),  "Why  Can't  Developing  Countries  Borrow  From  Abroad  in their  Own
Currency?"  Manuscript  Harvard University.
[12]  Chang, R.  and A. Velesco  (2002),  "Dollarization:  Analytical  Issues."  NBER Working  Paper
8838.
[13]  Cho,  I.-K.  and D.  KrE'ps  (1987),  "Signaling  Games  and  Stable  Equilibria."  The  Quarterly
Journal of Economics  102(2):  179-221.
[14]  Claessens,  S. and S. Djankov  (2000),  "Publicly  Listed  East  Asian  Corporates:  Growth,  Fi-
nancing  and Risks."  In D. Dwor-Frecaut,  F.  Colaco  and M.  Hallward-Driemeier  (eds.)  Asian
Corporate Recovery:  Findings From Firm Level  Studies in Five  Countries. Washington  D.C.,
World Bank:  97-109.
[15]  Conesa-Labastida,  A.  (1997),  Essays on  International  Finance,  Doctoral  Dissertation,  Mas-
sachusetts Institute of 'Cechnology.
[16]  Cowan,  K.  (2002),  "Firm Level Determinants  of Dollar Debt."  In Enquiries into the Behavior
of Emerging  Market  Firms, Doctoral Dissertation,  Massachusetts  Institute of Technology.
[17]  Diamond,  D.  W. and F. H.  Dybvig  (1983),  "Bank  Runs,  Deposit Insurance,  and  Liquidity."
Journal of Political Economy 91(3):  401-19.
[18]  Dwor-Frecaut,  D., F.  Ccolaco and M. Hallward-Driemeier  (2000),  "Asian Manufacturing Recov-
ery:  A Firm Level Analysis."  In D. Dwor-Frecaut,  F. Colaco and M. Hallward-Driemeier  (eds.)
Asian Corporate Recovery:  Findings From Firm Level Studies in Five  Countries. Washington
D.C., World Bank:1-17.
[19]  Eichengreen,  B. and R.  Hausmann  (1999),  "Exchange Rates and Financial  Fragility."  NBER
Working Papers 7418.
[20]  Gale,  D.  and  X.  Vives  (2002),  "Dollarization,  Bailouts,  and  the  Stability  of the  Banking
System."  The Quarterly Journal of Economics  117(2):  467-502
[21]  Hausmann, R., U. Panizza and E. Stein (2001),  "Why do Countries Float the Way they Float?"
Journal of Development  Economics  66:  387-414.
[22]  Hausmann,  R.  and U. Panizza  (2002),  'The Mystery of Original  Sin:  The Case of the Missing
Apple."  Prepared for the conference on Original  Sin and its Consequences,  IADB.
[23]  Jeanne,  0. (1999a),  "Foreign  Currency Debt and  Signaling."  Manuscript.
[24]  Jeanne,  0.  (1999b),  "Foreign  Currency  Debt,  Moral  Hazard and  Global  Financial  Architec-
ture."  Manuscript.
[25]  Jeanne, 0. (2000),  '"Foreign Currency Debt and The Global Financial Architecture."  European
Economic Review  44:  719-727.
26[26]  Jeanne,  0.  (2003),  "Why  do Emerging Market  Economies Borrow in Foreign Currency?"  Pre-
pared for the conference  on Original Sin and its Consequences,  IADB.
[27]  Krugman,  P. (1999a),  "Analytical Afterthoughts  on the Asian Crisis."
At http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www.
[281  Krugman,  P. (1999b),  "Balance  Sheets, the Transfer Problem,  and Financial  Crises."  Interna-
tional Tax and Public Finance  6(4):  459-72.
[29]  Lahiri,  A.  and C. V6gh  (2001),  "Living with the Fear of Floating:  An Optimal Policy Perspec-
tive."  Prepared for the NBER conference  on Currency  Crises  Prevention.
[30]  Levy-Yeyati,  E.,  F. Sturzenegger  and I.  Reggio  (2003),  "On the Endogeneity of Exchange  Rate
Regimes."  Manuscript  UCLA.
[31]  Lones,  S.,  and P. Sorensen (2000),  "Pathological Outcomes of Observational  Learning." Econo-
metrica 68.  371-398.
[32]  McLennan,  A.  (1984),  "Price Dispersion  and Incomplete  Learning in the Long Run."  Journal
of Economic Dynamics and  Control 7:  331-347.
[33]  Martinez  L.,  and  A.  Werner  (2001),  "The  Exchange  Rate  Regime  and the  Currency  Com-
position  of Corporate  Debt:  The Mexican  Experience."  Presented  in NBER Inter-American
Seminar  on Economics July 20-21.
[34]  Piketty,  T.  (1995),  "Social  Mobility  and Redistributive  Politics."  The  Quarterly  Journal  of
Economics  110(3).  551-584.
[35]  Obstfeld,  M and K.  Rogoff  (1995),  "The Mirage of Fixed Exchange  Rates."  Journal  of Eco-
nomic Perspectives  9(4):  76-96.
[36]  Schneider,  M. and A. Tornell  (2000),  "balance-sheet  Effects,  Bailout Guarantees  and Financial
Crises."  NBER Working  Paper 8060.
[37]  Tirole,  J.  (2002),  "Inefficient  Foreign  Borrowing:  A Dual-and-Common-Agency  Perspective."
Manuscript. Toulouse,  France.
27Table 1.  Bank Concentration
Three largest banks Assets/Total Assets
Region
year  _Latin America  East Asia  Eastem  Europe
1990  0.70  0.63  0.80
1991  0.74  0.59  0.84
1992  0.67  0.55  0.74
1993  0.56  0.59  0.67
1994  0.51  0.46  0.61
1995  0.47  0.46  0.59
1'996  0.48  0.45  0.56
1t997  0.55  0.51  0.67
1990-1997  0.57  0.53  0.67
Source: Beck, et.  al. (1999)  "A  New Database on Financial
Development  and Structure", Working  Paper 2146, World Bank.
28Figure 1: Dollar-Denominated  Liabilities to Total Credit
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This  variable  if  from  Calvo  and  lzquierdo  (2003)  and  is  calculated  as  the  ratio  of  dollar-
denominated  liabilities to total credit, where we proxy the former as the sum of dollar deposits and
foreign  liabilities.  The  data  regarding  dollar  deposits  is  hard  to  come  by  with,  particularly  for
countries  with  low  levels  of liability  dollarization.  Therefore,  the  authors  assume  this  variable
equal to  zero  for those  countries whose  Central  Bank does not  publish this  information.  Apart
from this measure,  all series are from the IFS  (IMF).
29Figure  2: Inflation and Original Sin
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